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Is Cash Compensation for Long-Tenured CEOs Efficiently Allocated? 
 
Abstract 
Uncertainty about a CEO’s ability is related to his/her length of service to a firm. Accordingly, 
monitoring systems should vary depending upon CEOs’ tenure. Long-tenured CEOs require less 
monitoring because their ability has been revealed over time. However, as CEOs advance in their careers, 
they are more likely to acquire power to influence board decisions. To analyze this implication, I use the 
previously reported differential sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to income-increasing and -
decreasing disposals. Contrary to prior findings, I find that cash compensation for long-tenured CEOs is 
positively associated with both income-decreasing but is shielded from income-increasing divesture 
decisions.   
 
Keywords: Long-tenured CEO, Cash Compensation, Efficient contract  
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Is Cash Compensation for Long-Tenured CEOs Efficiently Allocated? 
 
1. Introduction 
 Economic theory offers two competing hypotheses to explain the different sensitivities of CEO 
cash compensation to income-increasing and -decreasing components of earnings reported in prior studies 
(Gaver and Gaver 1998; Comprix and Muller 2006). Income-increasing accounting items tend to flow 
through to cash compensation, but compensation committees often shield CEO pay from the effect of 
income-decreasing components. The rent-seeking hypothesis predicts that when managers have superior 
power, discretion and knowledge, they have incentives to alter their compensation contracts for their own 
benefit (e.g., Edlin and Stiglits 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Hill and Phan 1991).2 On the other hand, 
the efficient contracting hypothesis predicts that a reward system can reduce problems associated with 
unobservable effort. Thus, compensation committees can devise well-designed contracts to reward 
managers for appropriate value enhancing activities (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1983; Milgrom and Roberts 
1992). The findings that the immediate positive effects flow through to cash compensation while negative 
ones do not can be interpreted as evidence of rent-seeking.  However, income-decreasing discontinued 
operations (hereafter DCs) contemporaneously reduce earnings and cash compensation, which can be 
interpreted as an efficient contracting mechanism. These off-setting phenomena make it difficult for us to 
distinguish empirically between the rent-seeking and efficient contracting.  I tackle this problem by 
concentrating on long-tenured CEOs who have already revealed their ability, but who also have perceived 
power to influence board members’ decisions.  
 Murphy (1986) analyzes the incentive and learning hypotheses and shows that long-tenured 
CEOs require less monitoring in late periods because their ability is revealed over time. However, the 
rent-seeking hypothesis suggests that since long-tenured CEOs can be entrenched, they are more likely to 
pursue their own interests rather than those of shareholders. Therefore, the design of their cash 
                                                          
2 Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda (2014) discuss a similar notion, which they call the managerial power hypothesis in the 
context of CEO dismissal. 
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compensation scheme provides an opportunity to empirically distinguish between the above two 
hypotheses. I pursue this course.  
 Widely publicized critiques of high executive compensation often imply that CEOs possess 
exceptional abilities that allow them to extract high rents (Friedman and Lev 1974; Darrough and 
Melumad 1995; Adel-Khalik 2003; Murphy and Zaboinik 2007). However, since managerial skills are 
difficult to verify ex ante, this uncertainty creates tension between owners and CEOs in the early stages of 
an executive’s career at a corporation.  As managers make a series of separate decisions over time, his 
ability to choose value-enhancing projects becomes increasingly apparent (Murphy 1986; Dikolli, Mayew 
and Nanda 2014). Presumably weak CEOs are eventually replaced by more capable ones, so there should 
be apparent differences in the certainty of long-tenured CEOs’ abilities compared to short-tenured 
managers.  
Yet, as CEOs advance in their careers, they are more likely to acquire the power to exercise 
influence over the board’s decisions. Fredrickson, Hambrick and Baumrin (1988) argue that over time, 
CEOs gain the power to control board members by nominating them. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) 
find evidence that executives have inordinate influence over the selection of board members, which 
contributes to deterioration of the board’s ability to monitor CEOs. Newman and Mozes (1999) find that 
CEOs often negotiate with compensation committees to adjust the terms of their pay packages.3 This 
leaves an intriguing question of whether, and to what extent, boards implement some sort of systems that 
force longer-tenured CEOs to demonstrate their continued ability to make value-enhancing decisions.     
Because cash-based compensation is usually directly tied to accounting numbers, it is easier for 
board members to use this component of CEO pay to provide incentives rather than contracts based on 
security prices, which are influenced by market expectations. Prior research suggests that CEO turnover is 
closely tied to accounting-based performance measures (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Murphy 1986). 
                                                          
3 For example, it is well-known that Steve Jobs accepted an annual salary of $1 when he rejoined Apple as interim 
CEO in 1997. He then received option grants worth $600 million in 2000. But when Apple’s stock price plunged, he 
received additional options valued at $90 million. Was this the result of negotiation, or did board members make 
these decisions independently? 
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Together, these threads of research indicate that accounting numbers are the useful and clear measures for 
board members to evaluate a CEO’s ability. 
DCs, which are reported in the income statement, provide a broad sample of readily observable 
disposal decisions. They are aggregated figures, and income-decreasing DCs most likely represent 
divestures of poorly performing units. However, the rationale behind of income-increasing DCs is not 
very clear. They can represent disposals of successful lines but they can also represent fire sales.4 The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) seems to desire that DCs should represent strategic shifts 
that have an effect on an entity’s operations and financial results (FASB 2013; 2014). Because managers 
must receive board approval for these actions, board members can closely monitor decisions about DCs 
and subsequent firm performance. 5  Therefore, I use DCs to analyze whether compensation committees 
utilize the link between CEOs’ decisions and subsequent firm performance to determine appropriate 
incentives for long-tenured CEOs.   
Prior studies extensively analyze rent-seeking activities through earnings management. CEOs 
often use earnings management to avoid missing a target if it will have a negative effect on their bonuses 
(e.g., Healy 1985; Dechow, Sloan Sweeney 1996; Guidry, Leone and Rock 1999). They also time the 
release of information to obtain benefits (Yermack 1997; Aboody and Kasznik 2000) and use their private 
information to increase profits (Ke, Huddart and Petroni 2003). CEOs influence the board’s decisions 
(e.g., Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Newman and Mozes 1999; Graham, Li and Qiu 2012). However, 
there is also evidence consistent with the efficient contracting theory. Murphy (1986); Defeo, Lambert 
and Larcker (1989); and Demski, Patell and Wolfson (1984) note that if board members can observe 
managerial actions, they can design CEO compensation contracts to preclude actions that they believe are 
contrary to the shareholders’ interests.  
                                                          
4 For example, IBM reported negative discontinued operations in 2002. According to USATODAY (07/10/2002), 
“The fourth-quarter of 2001 was a big loser for IBM's hard-disk drive business, which has struggled with 
profitability for years. IBM said that its after tax loss from the operations that quarter was $232 million and that net 
income after discontinued operations was $2.333 billion.” Xerox also reported discontinuing a poorly performing 
line of insurance and other financial services businesses in its 199510-k. 
5 For example, the 2001, 10k for ADAPTEC INC clearly reports the approval as follows “The Board of Directors 
formally approved a plan to spin-off their Software segment, Roxio on April,30, 2001.” 
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There are also studies that provide justifications as to why compensation committees should 
shield CEO cash payments from income-decreasing nonrecurring items. Dechow, Huson and Sloan 
(1994) suggest that compensation committees encourage CEOs to undertake value-enhancing but income-
decreasing activities. Duru, Iyenhar and Thevaranjan (2002) suggest that overly heavy reliance on 
market-based compensation creates inordinate emphasis on capital market performance.  
However, from the efficient contracting point of view, CEO cash compensation is sheltering 
income-decreasing DCs can be difficult to justify because of CEOs influence over board members’ 
decisions. Therefore, pushing long-tenured CEOs further, I investigate whether they are willing to bear 
the effect of income-decreasing DCs on their cash compensation in order to demonstrate their ability to 
make effective decisions. Long-tenured CEOs also must overcome market perceptions that they have 
overarching executive power to obtain inordinate compensation.  If their decisions can improve future 
performance, this may easily offset the costs of bearing a one-time negative effect on current profits. 
Therefore, under the efficient contracting theory, I hypothesize that income-decreasing DCs should be 
positively associated with cash compensation for long-tenured CEOs, which result in reducing current 
bonuses. Similarly, I hypothesize that there should be no association between income-increasing DCs and 
the cash compensation of long-tenured CEOs.  Decisions to dispose of profitable lines of business are 
problematic because such a choice increases current CEO remuneration. The rationale behind the 
divestiture can be desperation sales due to lack of cash, but, a decision might also result in stagnant future 
firm performance that can linger for several years.   
If markets pay little attention to managerial decisions, it is easier for executives to engage in rent-
seeking activities. Therefore, in preliminary analysis, I check whether market participants perceive that 
DCs send useful signals about value-enhancing managerial actions.  Finally and importantly, I examine 
whether disposal decisions are associated with improved subsequent firm performance, measured by 
earnings, gross margins and operating cash flows.  
I find evidence that cash compensation for long-tenured CEOs is positively associated with 
income-decreasing DCs and is shielded from income-increasing DCs . I also find that market participants 
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react favorably to managerial decisions for both income-increasing and -decreasing DCs, consistent with 
the notion that they view these DCs as value-enhancing activities.  
To test whether disposal decisions improve operating performance in the ensuing period. I 
calculate the rolling average of DCs over 6-year periods between 1993 and 2003 and regress the 
calculated rolling averages on earnings, gross margins and operating cash flows in the subsequent period 
from 2004 to 2008. I find compelling evidence that if the average of DCs over the prior 6 years is 
negative, earnings and operating cash flows improve. There is no evidence that disposing of profitable 
operations weakens distant future performance; however the effect of income-decreasing DCs on future 
earnings lasts as long as 6 to 8 years. 
Together these results support the efficient contracting hypothesis for long-tenured CEOs, 
suggesting that compensation committees provide opportunities for CEOs to demonstrate their abilities to 
actively engage in value-enhancing disposal decisions. Market participants perceive these activities as 
increasing firm value, which provides a venue for long-tenured CEOs to enhance their reputation. Finally, 
a post-performance analysis confirms that the firms meet market expectations.  
My analysis contributes to the prior research on nonrecurring items by reexamining previous 
findings of an asymmetrical relationship between CEO cash compensation and income-increasing or -
decreasing DCs (e.g., Gaver and Gaver 1998; Dechow, Huson, and Sloan 1994). I provide new insights 
regarding variations in the previously presented asymmetry and show that the shielding phenomenon 
reported in prior studies does not apply for long-tenured CEOs.  
My research also contributes to contracting theory, as my results regarding long-tenured CEOs 
are more consistent with the efficient contracting than rent-seeking hypothesis (Murphy 1986; Defeo, 
Lambert and Larcker 1989; Demski, Patell and Wolfson 1984; Darrough and Melumad 1995). The 
findings suggest that compensation committees strategically design executive cash compensation to 
provide opportunities for long-tenured CEOs to combat the market perception of their influence over 
board decisions.  
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I also contribute to research in management control systems (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Dikolli, 
Mayew and Nanda 2014). I show that capital market reactions to disposal decisions in conjunction with 
the sensitivity of such decisions to CEO cash compensation likely provide a dynamic monitoring 
structure, which underscores the superior ability of surviving CEOs. This system provides an opportunity 
for effective monitoring within an organization to assure that executives maintain their ability to make 
productive decisions.  
A caveat to my analyses of long-tenured CEOs is the difficultly in determining the time-frame 
needed for board members to develop trust in their CEO’s ability.  For example, Murphy (1986) analyzes 
the effect of CEO tenure on cash compensation for executives with less than 4.6 years of tenure compared 
to executives with over 10 years of tenure.  I define a long tenure as greater than 4 years. Using additional 
hand-collected data from 1992 to 2013, I show the executives in my sample actually have an average 
tenure of 11 years. There is also a concern about the characteristics of firms and industries.  Firms with 
short lives or more frequent changes in CEO probably have unique characteristics. Thus, I require my 
sample firms to have at least four years observations and no change in a CEO during this period to test the 
sensitivity of cash compensation for long-tenured CEOs. This can potentially create bias in my results.  
However, when I relax data restriction to at least three years of observations and control for firm 
characteristics that are akin to firms that have short life or that frequently change a CEO, I find similar 
results.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I outline and develop the 
hypotheses. In Section 3, I describe the sample, and in Section 4, the research design. In Section 5, I 
present the results, and I provide the conclusions in Section 6.      
2. Hypotheses Development Concerning The Management Control System  
In this section, I develop three hypotheses to test whether the design of CEO cash compensation, 
and subsequent firm performance are consistent with the efficient contracting or the rent-seeking theories. 
These three hypotheses together test the logical structure of a management control system. First, I test 
whether asymmetric sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to income-decreasing and -increasing DCs 
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differs by CEO tenure. I define “tenure” as the time that an executive has served as CEO of a firm and 
“long-tenured CEOs” as those who have held the position longer than 4 years.6  The second and third 
hypotheses tests whether accounting performance measures in the subsequent period are significantly 
associated with these past decisions, and if so, how long the effects last.  
2.1 Long-tenured and CEO Cash Compensations 
Gaver and Gaver (1998) as well as Comprix and Muller (2006) provide evidence that CEO cash 
compensation has an asymmetric association with income-increasing and -decreasing components of 
earnings. CEOs are often shielded from the effect of income-decreasing activities, but the effect of 
income-increasing activities flows through to CEO cash compensation. The rent-seeking hypothesis 
posits that managers take advantage of their positions, discretion and knowledge to influence board 
members so that they may receive a desired compensation design, while the efficient contracting 
hypothesis holds that managers are rewarded for appropriate value-enhancing activities that have long-run 
implications for firm performance. Prior studies have established several reasons why the weights 
assigned to the components of earnings differ. For example, Abdel-Khalik (1985) suggests that 
compensation committees adjust for the one-time effect of accounting changes by sheltering CEO 
compensation from the income-decreasing effect of a switch to the LIFO method. Natarajan (1996) 
argues that since some transactions are more vulnerable to managerial discretions and manipulation than 
others, compensation contracts adjust for these differences in order to effectively utilize these components 
of earnings to provide incentives to executives. Dechow, Huson and Sloan (1994) suggest that CEO 
compensation is shielded from restructuring charges in order to avoid penalizing executives for value 
enhancing activities. These studies focus on the characteristics of earnings to explain the asymmetric 
association.  
                                                          
6 The 4 year horizon is somewhat arbitrary. Thus, in the empirical analysis I vary this length. Because I  use data 
from 1993 to 2003 in this part of the analysis, the tenure has an upper bound of 2003. This makes 11 years the 
longest tenure. To trace information about these CEOs further, I hand collected from data up to 2013 and provide 
additional information about the means of age and tenure of these CEO in the company. This is reported in Table 2.    
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Gaver and Gaver (1998) suggest that the observed asymmetric sensitivity is potentially a rational 
response to competitive labor markets to retain talented CEOs. However, previous research has not 
explored this link between CEOs’ abilities and firms’ desire to retain talented CEOs. Thus, the current 
study analyzes whether compensation committees change CEO cash compensation based on a CEO’s 
longevity with the company as well as whether there is a system for executives to demonstrate their 
ability to produce value-enhancing activities.  
Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda (2014); Hermalin and Weisbach (1998); and Murphy (1986) provide 
some evidence that a long tenure helps to resolve uncertainty about a CEO’s ability, and this certainty 
further reduces monitoring costs. However, the ability of long-tenured CEOs to exercise influence over 
board members creates a caveat for compensation committees when appropriately designing their 
compensation. Dechow, Huson and Sloan (1994) find that CEO cash compensation actually increases as 
restructuring charges increase. This can be seen as an aggressive form of rent-seeking: executives make 
discretionary decisions to increase their cash pay despite of their previous poor operating decisions.  
Alternatively, this result can be interpreted as compensation committees encouraging CEOs to make such 
value-enhancing choices. I believe that varying the degree of CEOs’ tenure offers a unique opportunity to 
analyze the design of executive compensation in order to understand compensation committees’ 
intentions.  
2.1.1.CEOs’ Abilities and Incentives  
Economic theory suggests high executive compensation indicates that these CEOs possess unique 
abilities that are in high demand (Friedman and Lev 1974; Adel-khalik 2003; Murphy and Zaboinik 
2007).  Compensation committees should be willing to pay competitive compensation to CEOs whom 
they perceive to have exceptional knowledge and abilities. However, unobservable CEO ability creates an 
adverse selection problem where one party possesses private information that creates a disadvantage for 
others in a contracting situation.  Board members assume that CEOs have the expected ability ex ante; 
therefore, an efficient contract should have a system to verify this assumption.  An effective incentive 
system must produce value-enhancing outcomes and encourage CEOs to strive to attain corporate goals. 
10 
 
CEOs have the incentive to demonstrate their ability to differentiate their talent from others’ and enhance 
their reputation, and the board members have a strong interest in ensuring the legitimacy of high levels of 
executive compensation.  
Income-decreasing DCs reduce current bottom line earnings. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue 
that cash compensation should be shielded from these immediate decreases in current earnings in order to 
encourage CEOs to undertake such activities if they are value-enhancing.  Efficient contracting theory 
typically assumes that CEOs are risk averse and shareholders are risk neutral. The objective of the 
contract is to provide adequate incentives for executives to make value-enhancing decisions. However, 
many argue that the shielding phenomenon can be the result of long-tenured CEOs’ influence over the 
board’s decisions (Frediricson, Hambrick and Baumrin 1988; Hill and Phan 1991; Shivdasani and 
Yermack 1999). Hill and Phan (1991) argue that CEOs are often more interested in empire building than 
maximizing shareholders’ value. This stream of literature views the shielding as CEO rent-seeking 
activities. Therefore, for the efficient contracting theory, the shielding is not a sufficient contract.  
Long-tenured CEOs present an interesting case. While relatively inexpensive to monitor 
managers with well-established reputations, their influence over the board is probably strong.  For these 
executives, I propose a revised version of the efficient contracting hypothesis: rather than shielding them 
from the effects of income-decreasing DCs, their cash compensation should be exposed to these effects.  
Income-increasing and -decreasing DCs have asymmetrical impacts on current and future CEO 
cash compensation, as shown in Figure 1. Compensation committees can utilize this asymmetry to 
provide effective incentives for long-tenured CEOs to continue to demonstrate their ability to make value-
enhancing decisions. 
I propose that long-tenured CEOs should be willing to swallow the short-term ill consequence of 
income-decreasing DCs (the lower left-hand-side of the 2 by 2 matrix in Figure 1) to show their 
confidence in the long-term positive effects of their decision. They can enjoy the effect of improved 
future firm performance on their subsequent compensation (the lower right-hand-side of the 2 by 2 matrix 
in Figure 1), as well as on their reputation, without leaving doubts about their influence over board 
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decisions. Therefore, the negative effects flowing through to cash compensation demonstrate a CEOs’ 
willingness to make long-term value-enhancing decisions.   
If income–increasing DCs represent the disposal of profitable lines of business, it can send 
favorable signals about successful prior investment decisions. Long-tenured CEOs who have made such 
value-enhancing investment decisions may be willing to sell these ventures to establish the value of 
corporate assets or of their reputation. However, income–increasing DCs can also represent desperate 
choices where long-tenured CEOs are forced to sell assets due to lack of cash or the threat of missing debt 
obligations.  They should be reluctant to make such a choice because announcing these items reveals prior 
ill-investment choices and they may lead even worse future operating performance.  Black, Carnes and 
Richardson (2000) find that markets respond “negatively” to income–increasing DCs, presumably 
because investors perceive that such decisions reduce the future value of firms (the upper right-hand-
quadrant of the 2 x 2 matrix in Figure 1). Their argument and findings are more consistent with the latter 
scenario. If experienced CEOs are confident that their choices will not decrease future performance, they 
should be willing to make these disposal decisions even if their cash compensation is shielded from an 
income-increasing effect.7 But, compensation committees should wish to encourage such choices, 
therefore they should allow the positive effect to flow-through to cash compensation.  However, if they 
are worried about decreasing future performance, CEO cash compensation should be shielded from the 
positive effect. Accordingly, I develop my revised efficient contracting hypothesis more consistent with 
the second scenario for long-tenured CEOs as 
H1a: For long-tenured CEOs, cash compensation is positively associated with income-decreasing 
DCs and is shielded from income-increasing DCs. 
 
On the other hand, if long-tenured CEOs try to extract rents by exerting power in negotiations with board 
members, cash compensation should be shielded from income-decreasing DCs, and income-increasing 
DCs should flow-through to cash compensation. Accordingly, the traditional rent-seeking hypothesis is  
H1b: For long-tenured CEOs, cash compensation is shielded from income-decreasing DCs and 
positively associated with income-increasing DCs. 
                                                          
7 Darrough and Melumad (1995) suggest that better managers are always willing to take risks. 
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2.1.2 The Effect on Future Firm Performance  
An effective management control system should provide an evaluation process that reinforces the 
value-enhancing goal and ties this organizational goal to the manager’s reward system.  Monitoring 
subsequent firm performance is critical to achieving this goal and to encouraging CEOs to take 
responsibility for their decisions regardless of their tenure. In the following final analysis, I evaluate 
whether CEOs’ decisions produce value-enhancing outcomes.  
Cash compensation is usually tied to an accounting-based performance measure (e.g., earnings, 
ROA or ROE) that encourage CEOs to engage in value-enhancing activities and that better enhance goal 
congruence than market-based compensation, which is influenced by factors outside of a manager’s 
control (Sloan 1993; Duru, Iyenhar and Thevaranjan 2002).  Ex post performance evaluation of CEOs 
serves to enhance responsibility for their decisions. If firm performance deteriorates subsequent to DCs, 
this might indicate an unsuccessful choice and possibly heighten CEO career concerns. Ex post feedback 
provides completeness to assure that CEOs have and exercise the ability to accomplish organizational 
goals.   
Black, Carnes and Richardson (2000) find that capital markets penalize firms for disposing of 
profitable units, suggesting that market participants might perceive that such actions will create a future 
slowdown in business.  However, if a change in strategy is effective, such decisions should not create a 
long-term decline in firm performance even though there might be a temporary dip following the 
disposition or spinoff of a profitable operation. In the long-run, effective downsizing decisions should not 
harm future business operations regardless of whether reports of DCs are income-increasing or income-
decreasing. The efficient contracting hypothesis requires assessment of CEOs’ value-enhancing decisions. 
I test this premise in the ex post performance hypotheses:  
H2a: Income-decreasing DCs will improve future performance.  
 
H2b: Income-increasing DCs do not cause a sustained decline in future firm performance.  
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The implication of the rent-seeking hypothesis is that executives make myopic decisions to obtain short-
term benefits. Thereby, the rent-seeking hypothesis predicts the following:  
H3a: There is no long-term implication for income-decreasing DCs.  
 
H3b: Income-increasing DCs cause a sustained decline in future firm performance.  
 
3 Sample Selections  
3.1. Sample Description 
My initial sample comprises all available observations on the Annual Industrial and Research 
Compustat databases for U.S. firms from 1992 through 2008. I use the data from 1992 to 2003 to test 
hypotheses H1 and data from 2004 to 2008 to conduct the post-performance analysis.8 I eliminate all 
firm-years that have missing data for any of the following items: assets, earnings before DCs, sales, and 
book value of equity. I also collect capital market data from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) data base. I take the data on managerial compensation from the EXECUCOMP database, which 
contains comprehensive information for a sample corresponding roughly to the S&P 1,500. I lose the 
first-year observation for each firm because some variables require a one-year lag in the analysis.  
Because the interpretation of gross margin and operating cash flow differ between bank/financial 
institutions and other enterprises, I exclude the former sector from this analysis. For firms not reporting 
DCs, I set the values of that item to zero. These selection criteria result in a sample of 10,529 firm-year 
observations for the fiscal years 1993 to 2003, for a total of 1,821 firms, which I refer to as “the full 
sample” (Tables 1 and 2). This sample includes firms that did not report any DCs during this period.  
I also create a smaller sample by eliminating firms that do not report DCs at least once between 
1993 and 2003. This results in a sample of 3,993 firm-year observations for 581 firms. I refer to this 
smaller sample as “the restricted sample” (Tables 1 and 2). Both of these samples include firms that 
                                                          
8 Because the implementation of SFAS No. 131 in 1998 and No. 144 in 2002 might increase reports of DCs by 
widening the scope of definition, in the sensitivity analysis, I analyze the effect of this implementation on the results 
of hypothesis H1. But main results did not change.   
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change a CEO. For example, more than 60% out of 10,529 observations belong to firms that change a 
CEO.  
 I use the restricted sample to test my hypothesis H1. However, more than a 40% of the firms in 
this sample changes their CEO and some have only one, two or three years of observations (Panel A in 
Table 2). This raises a concern about differences in characteristics among these enterprises. Short lived 
firms and those that change CEO often probably are very different from those with a long-tenured 
manager. Therefore, to test the hypothesis H1, I impose further restrictions that firms must have at least 
four years observations and no change in CEOs during this period.  This reduces firm-year observations 
to 877 for 133 firms.         
To test the ex post hypothesis, I calculate firm-specific rolling averages of discontinued 
operations over six-year periods between 1993 and 2003. I then merge these with data from 2004 to 2008. 
This results in 2,898 firm-year observations of 672 firms.  
Many prior studies (e.g., Comprix and Muller 2006; Leone, Wu and Zimmerman 2006) winsorize 
all variables at the top and bottom 1% to mitigate the potential influence of outliers. However, firms that 
report DCs can face unusual business environments or serious operating or financial problems.  Because 
of this possibility, winsorization that truncates the data is not the best choice for the current study. Instead, 
I conduct outlier analysis by eliminating all observations that have residuals with a Cook’s D value higher 
than one and/or an R-Student value with an absolute value greater than three for each estimated regression 
model.9   
3.2. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 presents the percentage of reports of negative or/and positive DCs by industry. The first 
three columns are for the full sample and the last three columns are for the restricted sample. For 
example, Industrial Chemical sector in the full sample has 522 observations of which 0.32% report 
income-decreasing DCs (NGDC) and 0.3% report income-increasing DCs (PODC). There are clear 
                                                          
9 See Welsch (1980) for more details on the outlier analysis.  
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variations across industries.  The pharmaceutical, transportation equipment, communication and 
engineer/consulting sectors all have almost twice as many income-increasing as income-decreasing 
reports of DCs.  The electric utility sector has a high proportion of negative (0.16% in the full sample) 
relative to positive (0.09% in the full sample) reports. These patterns are generally similar for both the full 
and restricted samples. 
Panel A of Table 2 provides additional information about data. The first four columns of Panel A 
of Table 2 show that, year-by-year, the values of both income-increasing and -decreasing DCs increase 
for the restricted sample. The next three columns of Panel A of Table 2 show the data-span for a firm that 
reports DCs at least once during 1993-2003 (the restricted sample). The total number of firms is 581; 51 
of which (8.78%) have 11 years of observations. Most firms have more than 4 years of data.  The last 
three columns in the upper panel is this restricted sample and show that 87 firms changed their CEO twice 
and 25 firms changed their CEO three times. The similar descriptive statistics for the full sample are 
given in the lower panel. In this sample, there are 1,821 firms, and three firms changed their CEO 5 times 
during this 11-year period, though about 86% of the total changed their CEO once, at most.   
A long tenured CEO in this analysis is defined as an executive who remains at the same firm for 
more than 4 years in the restricted sample between 1992 and 2003. The average firms have a 7.5 year life 
in the sample (data-span), and there are 101 firms/CEOs. 10 To provide full perspective on these long-
tenured CEOs, I hand-collect information about their tenure after 2003 up to 2013 and report statistics in 
Panel B of Table 2.11 I calculate the duration of a CEO serving in the same firm (years in firm) as the 
difference between their starting and ending (last) year in EXECUCOMP, the last year being 2013. For 
the duration of CEO tenure (CEO tenure), I calculate the difference between the year that the CEO is 
appointed and the last year that they are designated as CEOANN in the sample. I also calculate the age of 
a CEO when he or she leaves the firm. The average CEO tenure is 10.7 years, the duration of working at 
                                                          
10 When the EXECUCOMP database does not report this information, I collect as much supplement information as 
possible through the internet.   
11 My additional restricted sample has 133 firms. 101 out of 133 firms have long-tenured CEOs. Two out of 101 
firms, I could not find information about the CEO. 
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the company (years in firm) is 16.7 years, and the average age at time of resignation is 63 years old. The 
youngest age of a CEO in the sample who left a firm is 39 and the oldest is 90. The average retirement 
age is similar to that found by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), who report it as between 62 and 66.  
There were no female long-tenured CEOs in this sample.   
Murphy (1986) analyzed the effect of CEO tenure on their cash compensation. He uses three 
specifications (years as CEO, years in firm, and age) to assess measure of CEO experiences. When he 
uses years as CEO, he divides his sample into three groups: years as CEO of less than 4.6, 4.6-9.9 and 
more than 10 years, and when he uses years in firm, he divides the sample into less than 21 years, 21-30 
years and more than 31 years.12  
In Panel C, I also provide the distribution by industry for these 101 firms/CEOs. I could not find 
the industry classification for one firm.  Unfortunately, however, when I merge these data with the data 
for the later years (2004-2008), I lose about 60% of long-tenured firms.  Only 37 out of 101 firms 
continue to exist in the later sample.  
4 Empirical Models 
4.1 Preliminarily Analysis 
In a preliminary analysis, I investigate whether disposal decisions can send signals to markets 
because these is conflicting evidence on whether investors react to reports of DCs. 13  Therefore, I 
                                                          
12 Dikolli, Mayew and Nanda (2014) examine the differences in performances of CEOs who depart and survive, 
using tenures of at least 4 years. The mean CEO tenure in Shivdasani and Yermacks’ study (1999) is 8.22 years, 
while that of Hill and Phan (1991) is 8 years. 
13 Bartov, Lindahl and Ricks (1998) show that market participants react to announcements of write-offs. When 
write-downs are on balance sheet items, market reactions are negative. But when they are related to operating 
activities, reactions are positive. They find that markets can distinguish between major changes in operations and 
simple write-offs, but they fail to fully incorporate all the value-relevant information into prices. Black, Carnes and 
Richardson (2000) show that markets respond “negatively” to income-increasing DCs and “positively” to income-
decreasing DCs, suggesting that capital markets understand the implications of these announcements. Their 
interpretation for the negative reactions to positive DCs is that market participants penalize managers for exiting 
profitable operations. These studies indicate that market participants respond, at least partially, to reports of DCs. 
However, Elliot and Hanna (1996) and Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) indicate that analysts exclude DCs from their 
earnings forecasts, implying that they ignore these items. Collins, Maydew and Weiss (1997) feel that the reason 
why analysts exclude these reports from their forecasts is because transitory items poorly explain the persistence of 
earnings. Fairfield, Sweeney and Yohn (1996) find evidence that discontinued operations are not informative about 
future profitability and Ali and Zawowin (1992 a, b) suggest that reports of transitory earnings weaken the 
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examine the capital market reactions to DCs during period between 1993 and 2003 and show that 
investors perceive that DCs provide useful information about managerial decisions that improve future 
performance, especially when disposals have negative value.  I present this result in Appendix I. 
4.2 The Empirical Model for Hypotheses H1a, and H1b   
In the main analysis, I test whether CEO cash compensation is positively associated with both 
income-increasing and -decreasing DCs for long-tenured CEOs. To do this, I first restrict my sample to 
firms that report DCs at least once. I also require that firms have cash compensation and do not change 
CEOs. Some firms exist only for short-time period as shown in the middle of the column in Panel A of 
Table 2. The characteristics of these firms are probably very different from firms that have long tenured 
CEOs. For example, growth and high tech firms might have frequent CEOs turn-over. In Panel C of Table 
2, I show that the Computer equipment, Computer and communication sectors have the smallest numbers 
of observations. Skinner (2008) argues that the intangible-intensive firms are fundamentally different. 
Therefore, as noted before I also requires at least four years of firm data.  
Following Comprix and Muller (2006) and Leone, Wu and Zimmerman (2006), I transform cash 
compensation into a logarithm form to reduce the skewness in the distribution while maintaining the 
interpretability of the estimated coefficient.  I modify Gaver and Gaver’s (1998) model to test hypotheses 
H1a and b including security returns to control for its significant association with cash compensation as 
reported in earlier studies (Leone, Wu and Zimmerman 2006; Comprix and Muller 2006; Duru, Iyenhar 
and Thevaranjan 2002). Since market-based compensation is the other type of incentive-based 
compensation, the inclusion of security returns should help to control for the effect of market performance 
on cash compensation. I also include a capital structure variable to control for these agency conflicts. The 
empirical model is as follows, 
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and an expanded model to test hypotheses H1a  and H1 b is as follows, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
informativeness of earnings for predicting the future.  Consistent with these findings, Barua, Lin and Sbaraglia 
(2010) suggest that CEOs can fool board members by shifting operating expenses to DCs. 
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where CCOM is the logarithm of CEO cash compensation, NNI is a dummy variable set to one if 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations is negative and is zero otherwise.  NI is 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, NGNI is a product of NNI and NI, 
INDC is the value of income-increasing DCs and if DCs is not positive, it is set to zero. DEDC is the 
value of income-decreasing DC and if DCs is not negative, it is set to zero.  RET is annual average of 
security returns, and CAP is capital structure, the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-term debt and 
the market value of equity.  PODC (NEDC) is a dummy variable set to one if discontinued operations are 
positive (negative) and is zero otherwise.  IDCLT (DDCLT) is the product of INDC (DEDC) and a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one when the current CEO is long-tenured and is zero otherwise.  I 
explain this variable in more detail below. All variables are adjusted for inflation using the consumer 
price index for the base year of 1993. I employ a fixed-effect model controlling for both industries based 
on four digits SIC codes and years to mitigate the impact of potential correlated omitted variables.14  
I test whether the association between CEO cash compensation and DCs for long-tenured CEOs 
is different from that for CEOs who have not reached or survived for long years.  I create a dummy 
variable set to one if a CEO has served for more than 4 years and zero otherwise. Under this definition 
and previously explained restrictions (e.g., at least four years data and no change in CEO), executives 
who have served at least five years are defined long-tenured CEO. For these managers, the dummy 
variable is set to one (42.3% of the sample). Those in the dummy variable zero are CEOs who have not 
served for five-years but who later become long-tenured CEOs or CEOs whose firm was listed on 
Compustat for only four years. I vary CEOs’ long-tenure span from 5 and 6 years to check the robustness 
of the estimated coefficient.  
                                                          
14 Murphy (1999) shows that executive compensation is similar across sectors. 
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Under the efficient contracting hypothesis (H1a), income-decreasing DC should be positively 
associated with executive cash compensation ( 065 >+ ββ  in model 2) and income-increasing DC should 
have no association ( 043 =+ ββ in model 2).  Under the rent-seeking hypothesis, cash compensation’s 
association with income-increasing DCs should be positive ( 043 >+ ββ in model 2) but there should be 
no association ( 065 =+ ββ in model 2) with income-decreasing DCs (H1b).  
4.3 An Empirical Model for Testing Ex Post Hypotheses H2a, H2b, H3a and H3b  
The ex post hypothesis assesses the completeness of the evaluation system. In this analysis, I use 
three classes of performance variables (PERM), earnings before extraordinary items per share (IBS), 
gross margin per share (GMS) and operating cash flow per share (OCFS) to assess the effect of 
managerial disposal decisions through DCs on future firm performance. IBS is a commonly used above-
the-line performance indicator. If managers pick one accounting measure to reflect their efforts, this is the 
most likely choice. GMS is revenue less COGS. Managers who efficiently utilize resources to 
manufacture better products should improve their gross margin, although fixed costs can potentially 
reduce the benefits.  If discontinuing a line of business increases overhead allocation to the remaining 
segments, this may reduce the positive effect of disposing of a poorly operating line of business on future 
gross margins. I expect that the effect of DCs on improving future GMS is less than that on earnings.  
Finally, it is possible that the CEO and board members may agree to undertake a discontinuation or 
divesture to create extra cash inflows or conserve cash outflows from operations. Cash flow constraints 
can occur in either a poorly performing operation or in a successful operation that requires continual 
investments. Therefore, the effect of DCs on operating cash flows is also analyzed.   
Reports of DCs are sporadic events. These infrequent occurrences might not provide enough 
variation to determine whether these managerial decisions affect future firm performance. In addition, 
DCs are often reported in blocks over several years and this creates a concern that a single report of DCs 
in a particular year may not be adequate to assess the effect of CEO disposal decisions. Denis, Denis and 
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Sarin (1997) and Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) show that divestures often occur as part of restructuring 
activities such as takeover attempts and management changes, which might explain this reporting pattern.  
To accommodate these report characteristics, I choose 6-year periods to calculate rolling averages 
of DCs. This method provides several additional advantages over a single report of DCs. First, the 6-year 
rolling average should eliminate any manipulations for optimistic estimation through DCs. For example, 
if the exit process is not completed within a year, a manager must estimate the values of the disposed 
assets, that is, the gain or loss from the operations of the component being discontinued. Due to the 
absence of quoted prices for many of firm-specific assets, managers might optimistically over-estimate 
values.  If the estimates are optimistic, they must be adjusted in the following years.  Second, this method 
also incorporates any true subsequent adjustments to the initial estimated value of disposing an operation 
and, hence, creates a more reliable value of DCs.  Lastly, this method allows for the assessment of the 
duration of DCs’ effect on firm performance. Figure 2 shows how I use the 6-year rolling averages to 
evaluate DCs’ effect on future firm performance (PERM) for the five years between 2004 and 2008.  For 
example, MDC38 is the rolling average between 1993 and 1998.  If MDC38 has a significant effect on 
earnings (IBS) between 2004 and 2008, it indicates that managerial decisions regarding DCs during 1993-
1998 had an impact on IBS even after 10 years. This is the longest time-horizon of the effect of DCs on 
firm performance in my research design.15 If the significant effect ends at MDC49, the effect lasts the 
second longest.   
After eliminating firms that do not have adequate data and firms newly listed between 2004 and 
2008, the final sample has 2,898 firm-year observations for 672 firms, and 230 of these firms report DCs 
at least once during the period of 1993-2003.16  I use these two samples (672 firms and 230 firms) to test 
whether the six-year rolling averages of DCs are associated with subsequent firm performance.  
                                                          
15 Suppose, an operation is discontinued in 1993. During the period between 1993 and 1998, there is downsizing 
operations in a firm. A significant impact indicates that its effect of this operation lasts more than 10 years.   
16 Since the 2,898 firm-year observations include firms that do and do not discontinue lines of business, the result 
from this analysis can be generalized. Moreover, some firms may not have data available in all years through 2008. 
But if a firm exists between 1992 and 2003 and survives into 2004, it is included in the sample. 
21 
 
First, to establish a benchmark, I calculated the 11-year average of DCs from 1993 to 2003 
(MDC) and create two cross-product terms: MDC is multiplied by (1) a dummy variable set to one when 
the average DCs is negative and to zero otherwise (NMDC), and (2) by a dummy variable set to one when 
the average discontinued operations is positive and to zero otherwise (PMDC).  Second, I calculate the 6-
year rolling averages variables (NMDC38, NMDC49, NMDC50, NMDC61, NMDC72, and NMDC83 for 
net negative average-valued DCs and PMDC38, PMDC49, PMDC50, PMDC61, PMDC72, and 
PMDC83for net positive average-valued DCs). 17  The model to test hypotheses H2 and H3 is estimated 
by employing these 6-year rolling averages in-turn. For example, the first estimate includes both 
NMDC38 and PMDC38, and the second estimate includes NMDC49 and PMDC49. The model is, 
1654,...3,...2103 __ −> +++++= itititTitTititiT SALEGRRDGRCGDPPMDCNMDCNGENPERM αααααα
 
itititit LGPERMASTUNASTGR εααα ++++ −1,387 _      (3) 
The performance measure PERM is for firm i in a year from 2004 to 2008. The subscripts, T and 
t, are the time indicators. T>03 in PERM indicates that the year of the variable starts from 2004. The 
rolling average variable is indicated with t,… T,  When t,… T is 1993 through 1998, this is the six-year 
average period indicating NMDC38 and PMDC38.  N indicates negative and P indicates positive 
averaged valued DCs.  
 The definition of the control variables are as follows. I include a dummy variable, NGEN, set to 
one when earnings before extraordinary item are negative in the period between 2004 and 2008 and to 
zero otherwise.  I include CGDP, change in per capita GDP, for the period from 2004 to 2008 to control 
for exogenous general economic factors on firm performance.18 I also employ three different kind of 
growth rates for the period from 2004 to 2008: the percentage growth in R&D expenditures (GR_RD), in 
sales (GR_SALE) and in book value of assets (GR_AST). I include the asset turnover (ASTUN) for the 
                                                          
17 NMDC38 is the 6-year rolling average for firm from 1993 to 1998, NMDC49 is for 1994 to 1999, and so on. 
18 I calculate CGDP, as the opposite of the change in real GDP per capita by subtracting the value in yeart-1 from that 
in yeart.  So a positive value indicates a decrease in GDP from the prior year, a sign of a weak economy. 
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period from 2004 to 2008. Finally, I add a lagged performance measure (LGPERM) to control for time 
series correlation between performance measures.19 
I also estimate the model using the restricted sample of only firms that report discontinued 
operations at least once during 1992-2003. In this sample, the comparison is among firms that report DCs 
and the sample size is much smaller, reducing the observations from 2,898 to 987. The model is as 
follows: 
ititTitTitiTiT RDGRCGDPPMDCMDCNGENPERM _54,...3,...21003 αααααα +++++=>
 ititititit LGPERMASTUNASTGRSALEGR εαααα +++++ −19876 __   (4) 
I test whether 2α is significantly negative and 32 αα + is positive.  
5 Results 
5.1 The Results for Testing for H1a, and H1b    
Panel A of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses.  The number 
of observations is different from that of the regression analysis due to elimination of outliers.  The 
proportion of CEO cash compensation to total compensation, of bonuses, and of market-based 
compensation (stock option plus restricted stock grants) are about 53%, 19% and 40%, respectively. The 
average annual cash compensations is about $1.190 million, while the median is $915,000. The average 
income is $129 million, while the median is $28 million. For a reference, although it is not tabulated, the 
3,993 observations of the restricted sample have the average income of $209 million and the medians of 
$50 million. About 16% of observations has negative earnings, and income, operating cash flow divided 
by assets, ROA and growth in R&D expenditures show no sign of financial distress for this group of 
firms.  About 14% of total observations report both income-decreasing and income-increasing DCs.  
Panel B of Table 3 reports the results for tests of the hypotheses H1a and H1b concerning the 
association between CEO cash compensation and reports of DCs for the long-tenured CEOs. A long 
tenured is variously defined as more than 4, 5 or 6 years as denoted it on the top row of Table 3. The first 
two columns are results without including two dummy variables for income-increasing and -decreasing 
                                                          
19 This is the period from 2003 to 2007. 
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DCs, and the next two columns include them. The model also includes security returns and a measure of 
capital structure, which are known to be correlated with cash pay (e.g., Duru, Iyenhar and Thevaranjan 
2002; Comprix and Muller 2006; Leone, Wu and Zimmerman 2006; Jensen and Meckling 1976), with 
controls for industry and year effects.  
The variable INDC presents income-increasing and DEDC income-decreasing DCs. I test the 
sensitivity of cash compensation to income-increasing DCs for long-tenured CEOs with the sum of the 
coefficients on INDC and INCLT ( 43 ββ + ).Panel B of Table 3 shows that the coefficient ( 43 ββ + ) is 
0.0893, significantly positive for long-tenured CEOs, which is defined as CEO more than 4 years (the 
first column). The null hypothesis 043 =+ ββ is rejected with p-values of <0.0001 as shown in the next 
column. The result is similar when I include the two dummy variables, PODC and NEDC (the next two 
columns). However, when CEO tenure is defined as more than 5 or 6 years, these two results show the 
difference, indicating importance of inclusion of these two dummy variables.  When a long tenure is 
defined as more than 5 years, the significant level weakens, and when I include two dummy variables, I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis anymore. This is also true for the result for a long tenure that is defined 
as more than 6 years. When the model includes two dummy variables I cannot reject the null hypothesis 
043 =+ ββ at a 5% level of the confidence. The p-value is 0.0695.   
The sensitivity of cash compensation to income-decreasing DCs for long-tenured CEOs is tested 
with the sum of the coefficients DEDC and DDCLT ( 65 ββ + ). The results on Panel B show that the 
coefficient 65 ββ + is 0.0505, significantly positive, and the null hypothesis 065 =+ ββ is rejected with p-
values of 0.0343 for long-tenured CEOs, which is defined as more than 4 years. However, when I include 
the two dummy variables, PODC and NEDC (the next two columns), although the coefficient is positive 
it becomes insignificant.  In this model, the result is also positive but insignificant for the specifications of 
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CEO tenure of more than 5 years.20 But for the specifications of CEO tenure of more than 6 years, the 
coefficient is significantly positive.21  These findings show that the associations between cash 
compensation and income-decreasing DCs moves toward significantly positive as CEOs tenure becomes 
longer, but for income-increasing DCs, the coefficient tends to be insignificant.  
The results for income-decreasing DCs for long-tenured CEOs (the coefficient on the dummy 
variable), PODC, is significantly positive, indicating that CEO cash compensation for the firms that report 
income-increasing DCs are higher than the rest. However, the coefficient on NEDC is insignificant, 
suggesting that there is no difference in cash compensation for firms reporting income-decreasing DCs.  
In sum, the influence of the intercept terms (PODC and NEDC) on the hypothesized results is 
obvious, suggesting that controlling for these variables is important to assure too much weight is not 
assigned to the interaction terms.  Focusing on the second column of Panel B of Table 3, the results 
present an interesting contrast. When the long-tenure is defined as more than 4 years, the rent seeking 
hypothesis is supported. But, when it moves to more than 5 or 6 years, my revised efficient contracting 
hypothesis H1a is supported, suggesting that long-tenured CEOs have to overcome market perceptions 
that they have overreaching executive power to obtain their desired compensation. They are willingly to 
swallow the effect of income-decreasing DCs flowing through to cash compensation. Black, Carnes and 
Richardson (2000) find that market participants worry that disposal of a profitable line of operation might 
harm future operating performance. My findings also show that they are willing to realize “no” current 
benefits from the disposal of profitable operations.  
5.2 The Results of The Tests for H2 and H3, Ex Post Performance Hypotheses  
To complete the analysis of the effectiveness of management control systems, I regress the rolling 
average DCs on per share earnings (IBS), gross margins (GMS), and operating cash flows (OCFS) for the 
period 2004-2008 to evaluate the effect of CEOs’ disposal decision based on subsequent firm 
                                                          
20 Since 
5β and 6β are separately insignificant, I also test whether income-decreasing and -increasing DCs are 
positively associated with cash compensation using only the long-tenured CEOs sample. I confirm the above 
findings and present the result in the sensitivity analysis section.    
21The positive coefficient and the rejection of the null hypothesis are consistent throughout for all specifications of 
CEO tenure without these two dummy variables.  
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performance.  The results for the tests of the ex post performance hypotheses are presented in Table 4.  
The left-hand panel shows the results for earnings as the performance measure, the middle is for gross 
margins and the right-hand panel is for operating cash flows. The lower six panels of each column report 
the results for the 6-year rolling average analyses. The analysis of the 11-year rolling average shown in 
the upper panel sets a benchmark against which to judge whether the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables are similar across all 6-year rolling models. Since they are, I present only the coefficients on the 
cross-product terms in the lower panels.  
The Results for the 11 Year-Average Models  
As noted above, the results for the 11-year average model are presented mainly to demonstrate 
the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the control variables.  The coefficient on NGEN is 
significantly negative for all models, indicating that when earnings are negative, these three performance 
measures are lower. For the earnings model, the coefficients on the control variables are all statistically 
significant. However, the RD growth rate is insignificant in the other two models, and the change in per 
capita GDP, the sale growth rate and the asset growth rate are insignificant in the model of operating cash 
flow. All performance measures have a positive time-series correlation. All specifications indicate that 
higher asset turnover is associated with better future performance.   
The Results on the 6-Year Rolling Average Models  
The effects of 6-year rolling averages of DCs on future firm performance between 2004 and 2008 
are shown in the lower panels of Table 4. The results show that reports of past income-decreasing DCs 
generally have a positive impact on future earnings. The coefficients on NMDC83, 72 and 61 (averages 
calculated between 1998 and 2003, 1997 and 2002, and 1996 and 2001, respectively) are statistically 
significantly negative with p-values of 0.0009, 0.0001 and 0.0157, respectively. For income-increasing 
past DCs, the coefficient on PMDC83 is significantly negative (with a p-value of less than 0.0001), and 
all other coefficients on reports of income-increasing DCs are insignificant. The results in the model of 
gross margin are less robust than those for earnings. The coefficients for firms reporting income-
decreasing DCs are statistically significantly negative only up to NMDC72. The coefficients on all of the 
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more distance periods are insignificant. On the other hand, for firms reporting income-increasing DCs, the 
coefficient for PMDC83 is negative with a p-value of 0.0012, but that for PMDC61 is positive with a p-
value of 0.0958.  In the model of operating cash flows, the coefficient on income-decreasing DCs is 
statistically significantly negative up to NMDC72 with a p-value of less than 0.0001. This significance 
level is stronger than that for gross margin. For firms reporting income-increasing DCs, the coefficient on 
PMDC83 is insignificant. However, that on PMDC49 is significantly positive with a p-value of 0.0674.  
The results for the restricted sample are shown in Table 5. Similar to Table 4, the left-hand panel 
in Table 5 shows the results for the model of earnings, the middle for gross margins and the right-hand 
panel for operating cash flows. Since the comparison is among firms that have reported discontinued 
operations, it is more difficult to generalize these findings.  
The sample size for these estimates is less than one-third of the full sample. The estimated 
coefficients on the control variables for 11-year rolling average models are similar to those reported in 
Table 4. The results for the 6-year rolling average regressions show that income-decreasing DCs have a 
positive effect on future performance (the lower panel in Table 5).  The coefficients on income-decreasing 
DCs are statistically significantly negative up to MDC61 for the earnings model and up to MDC72 for the 
operating cash flows model—however, they are insignificant in the model of gross margins. For firms 
disposing of profitable lines, PMDC83 has a negative coefficient. These findings are generally consistent 
with the results reported for the full sample model in Table 4.  
In sum, I conduct post-performance analyses using both the full and restricted samples and find 
compelling evidence that the income-decreasing DCs improve future operating performance, supporting 
hypothesis H2a, meaning that DCs are value-enhancing activities. In particular, income-decreasing DCs 
improve future earnings, gross margins and operating cash flows.  I also find that, in general, the 
disposition of profitable operations (income-increasing DCs) do not create a long-term decline in future 
earnings, supporting H2b. However, they “temporarily” reduce earnings and gross margins. There is no 
temporary reduction in future operating cash flows. The results from the restricted sample are weaker than 
those of the full sample. Since the benchmark in the restricted sample is other firms that have engaged in 
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disposal of operations, the results from this comparison cannot be generalized. However, it is useful as 
robustness check.  There is no evidence to support the rent-seeking hypothesis (H3a or H3b) where 
executives temporarily increase earnings and create distractions concerning future firm performance. 
The duration of the effect of income-decreasing DCs on earnings is longer than that of on the 
other two performance measures. The result for earnings indicates that the positive effect of managerial 
disposal decisions on firm performance lasts 6 to 8 years. The magnitude of the economic impact of 
income-decreasing DCs on the improvement of gross margins is much smaller than that for earnings. For 
example, based on the full sample, the average of negative DCs per share between 1997 and 2002 
improves the gross margin per share by 0.18 % in the subsequent period while it improves earnings by 
3.56%.22    
Although the analyses in this section show improved ex post performance, a caveat to this 
analysis is whether environmental factors that affect all firms were adequately controlled for. I did not 
employ a matching-sample research design to compare the performance of two similar groups. If all firms 
improve their performance between 2004-2008, my findings may be contaminated by a favorable 
economic environment. However, as this period was heading toward a recession, I do not believe this is 
the case.  My concern with regard to a matching-sample research design is that the small portion of firms 
that report DCs might face unique financial and business conditions. These characteristics of DCs may 
make it difficult to find a good matching sample.  
5.3. Sensitivity Analyses     
I create a sample only with long-tenured CEOs that is defined as CEO more than 4 years, and 
estimate model 1 to test hypotheses H1a and H1b. This sample has only 371 firm-year observations.  
Panel A of Table 6 provides descriptive statistics and Panel B presents the results of hypotheses. Panel B 
clearly shows that the coefficients for both income-increasing (INDC) and -decreasing DCs (DEDC) are 
                                                          
22 The average gross margin per share between 1997 and 2002 is $8.6337 and earnings per share are $1.1062. The 
rolling average of negative discontinued operations per share is $0.0245. Thus, the effect on gross margin is 0.18%= 
(-0.647*-0.0245)/8.4644, and that on earnings is 3.56%= (-1.6092*-0.0245)/1.1062.  
28 
 
statistically significantly positive. The result for income-decreasing DCs supports the efficient contracting 
hypothesis. However, for income-increasing DCs, the result supports the rent seeking hypothesis.   
I also changed data restrictions from firms with at least 4 years of observations to 3 years of 
observations in order to increase the number of observations and estimate modified models 1 and 2 by 
including variables, cash holding (cash divided by assets), an annual growth rate for R&D expenditures 
and annualized value of security return volatility. Now I have 964 firm-year observations.  The results are 
similar to those reported in Table 3. When CEO tenure is defined as more than 4 years, the coefficients on 
both income-increasing and –decreasing DCs reject the null hypothesis.  But when CEO tenure is defined 
more than 5 years, the coefficient on income-increasing DC cannot reject but the coefficient on income-
decreasing DCs rejects the hypothesis.  Therefore, cash compensation is shielded from the effect of 
income-increasing DCs but the effect of income decreasing DCs flow through to cash compensation.  
Some may argue that the implementation of SFAS No. 131 and No. 144 increased the opportunity 
for executives to manage earnings. I test whether there is a difference in the association between CEO 
cash compensation and reports of DCs before and after the implementation of SFAS No. 131 in 1998. I 
found some differences in the associations between the period before and after, but the basic results are 
similar.  
In the tests of hypotheses H2 and H3, I use earnings before extraordinary items to calculate 
earnings performance (IBS). To test the robustness, I also employ an earnings measure closer to core 
earnings by excluding special items and repeat the analyses. The results are very similar to those reported 
in Tables 4 and 5, further supporting the notion that DCs, on average, improve ex post earnings.   
There is often time-series correlation in accounting-based performance measures.  Therefore, if I 
drop the prior period performance measure (LGPERM) from equations 3 and 4, the results should be 
stronger.  I confirm this prediction, suggesting that it is important to control for the time-series correlation 
to mitigate the influence of the autoregressive nature of performance measures. 
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6. Conclusions 
I analyze whether CEO cash compensation is structured to provide appropriate incentives for 
long-tenured CEOs to combat market perceptions about their influence over board decisions.  I test three 
hypotheses to contrast two competing theories—efficient contracting and rent-seeking—by focusing on 
managerial disposal decisions.  
Because disposal actions require board approval, the recent public outcry over high CEO pay 
should make compensation committee members very sensitive about these decisions. Therefore, I expect 
that board members will closely scrutinize decisions on DCs to assure their monitoring system limits 
managerial ability to extract rents. I find that the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to income-
increasing and -decreasing DCs differs depending upon CEO tenure. I also found that the effects of 
income-decreasing DCs generally flow through to cash compensation for long-tenured executives who 
serve as a CEO for more than 5 years.  On the contrary, cash compensation is shielded from the effect of 
income-increasing DCs for these CEOs.   
According to the rent-seeking hypothesis, long-tenured CEOs can exert influence over the 
board’s decisions. When a contract is efficient, compensation committees should design CEO pay to 
mitigate such incentives. My findings of the positive association between CEO cash compensation and 
income-decreasing DCs and no association with income-increasing DCs for long-tenured CEOs are 
consistent with the efficient contracting hypothesis that compensation committees provide incentives to 
CEOs to demonstrate their ability to make effective decisions. DCs are reported as aggregated values and 
when the value is negative, they are probably dispositions of poorly performing components. The 
contemporaneous effect of income-decreasing DCs is to reduce current earnings. But, disposition of poor 
operations should improve future operating performance. The positive association suggests that long-
tenured CEOs are willing to swallow the one-time negative effect in order to improve future operating 
performance. Similarly, lack of association with income-increasing DCs indicates that long-tenured CEOs 
do not receive any contemporaneous benefits by making this decision. If CEOs make the wrong decision 
to dispose of a profitable operation, the choice can lead to long-term stagnation. Such a failure is 
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undesirable for building their reputation. However, when I isolate firms that have long-tenured CEOs 
more than four years and conduct the same analysis, both income-decreasing and –increasing DCs are 
positively associated with cash compensation. Therefore, there is possibility that these CEOs are still 
rewarded for engaging in income-increasing DCs in the disposal year. 
I also show that market participants react to disposal decisions and perceive both income-
increasing and -decreasing DCs to be value-enhancing activities.  Market scrutiny makes it difficult for 
CEOs to engage in rent-seeking activities.  Furthermore, the analysis of the subsequent period provides 
compelling evidence that income-decreasing DCs improve future earnings, gross margins and operating 
cash flows. I find the effect of these improvements lasts between 4 and 8 years. I also find no evidence 
that income-increasing DCs have long-term detrimental effects for firms.   
These findings together suggest that compensation committees carefully consider how to reward 
long-tenured CEOs. As board members and shareholders learn about executives’ skills, CEOs can acquire 
bargaining power in negotiations. The results suggest that compensation committees use cash 
compensation to encourage executives to continue to demonstrate their ability to make value-enhancing 
decisions.  Disposal decisions are useful for compensation committees to provide incentives for long-
tenured CEOs. The ex post analysis shows that disposal decisions meet market expectations. Thus, these 
results suggest that shareholder scrutiny and the sensitivity structure of cash compensation together create 
a dynamic monitoring system that encourages long-tenured executives to continue to engage in value-
enhancing activities.  
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Appendix 1 
In a preliminary analysis, I examine the capital market reactions to DCs during period between 
1993 and 2003. I include a set of performance variables to reduce omitted variable problems and estimate 
the models below.   
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RET is security returns. DC is discontinued operations per share. PODC is a dummy variable set to one if 
DC is income-increasing and otherwise is zero. The same holds for NGDC if DC is income-decreasing.  
NDC is a product of DC and NGDC. ENS is earnings before extraordinary items per share, and LG_BV 
is the one-year lagged book value of equity per share. DC, ENS and LG_BV are all weighted by the one-
year lagged security price.  SDS is annualized standard deviation of security returns.  The performance 
variables are GR_AST (the annual growth rate in assets), GR_SALE (the annual growth rate in sales) and 
OPCF (operating cash flow per share divided by one-year lagged of security price). I use an Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) fixed-effects model, controlling for both years (Y) and industries (IND). I estimate 
the model twice using two samples. The full sample, and a restricted sample, which includes only firms 
that report DCs at least once during the period between 1993 and 2003. 
Panel A of Table A1 presents descriptive statistics for the restricted sample. Security returns 
(RET) are skewed to the left, where the mean is 4.63 % and the median is 8.19%. I also examine two 
measures of abnormal returns, one adjusted for industry and year average returns (ABRETIND) and the 
other adjusted for firm average returns (ABRETF). These are also skewed to the left.  
The empirical results are presented in Panel B of Table A1.23 The coefficient on income-
decreasing DCs (NDC) is significantly negative with a p-value of 0.0005 for the full sample and less than 
0.0001 for the restricted sample. The magnitude of the coefficient 4α on NDC is larger than that on DC, 
                                                          
23 I first conduct outlier analyses and eliminate observations if regression residuals have a Cook’s D greater than 
one, and R-student residual greater than the absolute value of three. I report results after adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity. 
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3α , for both samples. The tests for 043 =+αα  are rejected in both samples with p-values of 0.0002 and 
0.0001. The coefficient on positive DCs ( 3α ) is significantly positive with a p-value of 0.0203 for the 
restricted sample, but is insignificant for the full sample with a p-value of 0.1264.  It is worth noting that 
the coefficient 3α for the full sample is influenced by firms that do not report discontinued operations, 
which might create downward bias in the estimated coefficient. The coefficients on the dummy variables 
for negative DCs, NGDC, are statistically significantly negative with p-values of 0.0015 and 0.0463, 
respectively, while those for positive DCs, PODC, are insignificant.  
These results are also economically significant. Given that average income-decreasing DCs per 
share weighted by lagged share price for the restricted sample is -0.0076 (Panel A of Table A1) and the 
estimated coefficient on NDC for the restricted sample is -0.9845 (Panel B), the decisions to dispose of 
poorly performing operations, on average, produces 0.75 % higher stock returns.  While the average 
income-increasing DCs per share weighted by lagged price is 0.0060 and the estimated coefficient is 
0.4313, meaning that decisions to discontinue profitable operations, on average, create 0.26% higher 
returns.24 
The estimated coefficients for the control variables all make good sense. The coefficients on 
earnings and book value are significantly positive. The coefficients for all performance variables are 
significant and have the expected signs. When the performance measures are high, security returns 
increase; while these measures are low, security returns also are low. As expected, security volatility is 
negatively associated with security returns. In sum, these results present compelling evidence that 
investors perceive that DCs provide useful information about managerial decisions that improve future 
performance, especially when disposals have negative value.   
                                                          
24 If year, industry, and firm-specific factors are not well controlled for, this can create an omitted variable problem. 
To further mitigate this problem, I also estimate two additional models using abnormal returns as the dependent 
variables: one adjusted for industry and year average returns (ABRETIND) and the other adjusted for firm average 
returns (ABRETF).  Although the results are untabulated, there are significant negative coefficients on income-
decreasing DCs, while income-increasing DCs have significant positive coefficients for both specifications (full and 
restricted samples). The null hypothesis that the coefficients for income-decreasing DCs are equal to zero is rejected 
in both models of abnormal returns, providing assurance that the coefficient is negative. 
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Table A1 The Results for Testing the Capital-Market Reactions 
 
Panel A Descriptive Statistics for the Restricted Sample  
Variable N Mean Median Q1 Q3 STD  
RET 3,867 0.0463 0.0819 -0.1627 0.3014 0.4643 
ABRETIND 3,867 -0.0011 0.0166 -0.1917 0.2171 0.4149 
ABRETF 3,867 0.0000 0.0121 -0.2060 0.2262 0.4376 
DC 3,867 0.0215 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.1132 
NGDC 3,867 0.1513 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3584 
PODC 3,867 0.1541 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3611 
NDC 3,865 -0.0076 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0551 
PDC 3,865 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0446 
ENS 3,865 0.0273 0.0456 0.0169 0.0706 0.1194 
LG_BV 3,865 0.5306 0.4268 0.2674 0.6531 0.4576 
OPCF 3,864 0.1139 0.0895 0.0441 0.1485 0.1857 
GR_AST 3,867 0.1201 0.0531 -0.0290 0.1664 0.4710 
GR_SALE 3,865 0.0837 0.0577 -0.0285 0.1555 0.3021 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
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 Full Restrict 
 Est P Valuea Est P Valuea 
PODC 0.0196 0.2657 0.0245 0.1802 
NGDC -0.0547 0.0015 -0.0361 0.0463 
DC 0.2799 0.1264 0.4313 0.0203 
NDC -0.8275 0.0005 -0.9845 <.0001 
ENS 0.3978 <.0001 0.7895 <.0001 
LG_BV 0.2132 <.0001 0.2385 <.0001 
SDS -0.7347 <.0001 -0.6903 <.0001 
GR_AST 0.1511 <.0001 0.1386 <.0001 
GR_SALE 0.1616 <.0001 0.1394 0.0008 
OPCF 0.3373 <.0001 0.1758 0.0018 
     
     
043 =+αα  -0.5476 0.0002 -0.5532 0.0001 
Fixed effect Yes  Yes  
OBS 10,117  3,798  
Adjusted R2 30.29%  32.87%   
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Table A1 Continued 
  
RET  Annual average security returns 
ABRETIND  Annual average security returns minus annual industry average returns  
ABRETF  Annual average security returns minus firm average returns 
PODC  A dummy variable sets to one if DC is positive otherwise it is set to zero. 
NGDC  A dummy variable sets to one if DC is negative otherwise it is set to zero. 
DC  Ratio discontinued operations per share to one-year lagged security prices 
NDC  Ratio of the product of DC and a dummy variable set to one if DC is negative 
zero otherwise to one-year lagged security prices. 
ENS  Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items per share to one-year lagged 
security prices 
LG_BV  Ratio of one-year lagged of book value of equity per share to one-year lagged 
security prices 
SDS  Annualized standard deviations of security returns. 
GR_AST  The annual assets growth rate. 
GR_SALE  Annual sales growth rate. 
OPCF  Ratio of operating cash flows per share to one-year lagged security prices.  
a  Heteroscedasticity adjusted P-value. 
b  Test that the coefficient is significantly different from 0.  
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Table 1 Samples and the proportion of the reports of negative or positive discontinued operations by 
industries 
 
  Full Sample Restricted Sample 
SIC Code Industry  #of obs %NGDC  %PODC # of obs %NGDC  %PODC 
2800=< siccd < 2830  
2840=< siccd < 2900 
Industrial Chemical 522 0.32 0.3 238 0.85 0.8 
2830=< siccd < 2840 Pharmaceuticals 388 0.16 0.33 170 0.43 0.88 
3570=< siccd < 3580 Computer Equip 334 0.13 0.07 68 0.35 0.18 
3600=< siccd < 3700 Electric Equip 990 0.5 0.47 315 1.33 1.23 
3700=< siccd < 3800 Transport Equip 376 0.18 0.4 190 0.48 1.05 
3800=< siccd < 3899 Measurement Equip 592 0.47 0.42 218 1.23 1.1 
4800=< siccd < 4900 Communication 209 0.11 0.23 82 0.3 0.6 
7400=< siccd < 7380 Computer 738 0.29 0.28 176 0.78 0.75 
8700=< siccd < 8800 Engineer and Consulting 127 0.06 0.15 46 0.15 0.4 
3300=< siccd < 3400 Primary 345 0.22 0.23 177 0.58 0.6 
4900=< siccd < 5000 Electric Utilities 123 0.16 0.09 71 0.43 0.23 
1000=< siccd < 1300  
1400=< siccd < 2000 
Mining and Construction 241 0.14 0.13 101 0.38 0.35 
1300=< siccd < 1400  
2900=< siccd < 3000 
Extraction 479 0.22 0.26 187 0.58 0.68 
2000=< siccd < 2111 Food 383 0.19 0.18 157 0.5 0.48 
2200=< siccd < 2780 Textiles and Printing 944 0.47 0.46 367 1.25 1.2 
4000=< siccd < 4800 Transportation and Air 160 0.07 0.1 66 0.18 0.28 
5000=< siccd < 6000 Retail 1,693 0.87 0.59 602 2.3 1.55 
7000=< siccd < 7370, 
7380=< siccd < 8700,  
8800=< siccd < 9000 
Service 
600 0.37 0.36 220 0.98 0.95 
Others  1,285 0.78 0.81 542 2.05 2.13 
Total   10,529     3,993     
 
%NGDC   The percentage of total observations in the industry that report income-decreasing 
discontinued operations.  
%PODC  The percentage of total observations in the industry that report income-increasing 
discontinued operations. 
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Table 2 Additional Information about Data 
Panel A: Year, Firm Data-Span, CEO changes   
 Firm-year level (N=3,993)   Firm level   Firm level  
year DC PDC 
(%) 
NDC 
(%)  
The data-
span by firm 
N Frequency  CEO 
change  
N  Frequency 
1993 -15.5129 0.0826 0.1074 1 33 5.68 0 232 39.93 
1994 4.1774 0.0993 0.0856 2 38 6.54 1 237 40.79 
1995 1.4322 0.1339 0.1260 3 39 6.71 2 87 14.97 
1996 4.1047 0.1411 0.1083 4 47 8.09 3 25 4.30 
1997 11.8080 0.1625 0.0825 5 43 7.40 Totala 581 100 
1998 21.3030 0.1317 0.1146 6 50 8.61 0 969 53.21 
1999 33.1942 0.1836 0.0894 7 32 5.51 1 597 32.78 
2000 -10.1840 0.1429 0.1621 8 53 9.12 2 190 10.43 
2001 31.7494 0.1389 0.1338 9 95 16.35 3 56 3.08 
2002 -67.0381 0.1671 0.2818 10 100 17.21 4 6 0.33 
2003 19.0063 0.2422 0.3166 11 51 8.78 5 3 0.16 
    Total 581 100 Totalb 1821
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Panel B: Long Tenured CEOs (CEO-tenure > 4)   
Variable Mean Median Q1 Q3 STD N 
Data-Span 7.4356 7 6 9 1.9048 101 
Years in firm 16.7273 14 11 21 9.3643 99 
CEO tenure  10.6931 10 7 13 4.7394 101 
CEO AGE  62.9798 63 58 67 8.2845 99 
 
DC  The average annual reports of discontinued operations  
PDC  The percentage of  reports of positive discontinued operations  
NDC  The percentage of reports of negative discontinued operations 
The data span by firm  The number of years data are available for a firm   
N  The number of firms  
CEO change   The number of CEO changes for a firm  
Data-Span  The average firm/life in the sample from 1992-2003  
Years in firm  The average duration of working in the company from the start to the end year(up to 
2013) 
CEO tenure   The average length of being CEO from the start to the end of CEO (up to 2013) 
CEO age  The average age of the CEO when they step out of the current position. 
a  The restricted sample of firms that report discontinued operations at least once. 
b  The full sample of firms regardless of reports of discontinued operations 
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Table 2 continued 
Panel C: The Distribution of Industry 
SIC Code Industry  Total Companies 
disappear 
before  2004 
Companies 
exist after 
2004  
2800=< siccd < 2830  2840=< siccd < 2900 Industrial Chemical 5 2 3 
2830=< siccd < 2840 Pharmaceuticals 2 1 1 
3570=< siccd < 3580 Computer Equip 0 0 0 
3600=< siccd < 3700 Electric Equip 10 1 9 
3700=< siccd < 3800 Transport Equip 4 1 3 
3800=< siccd < 3899 Measurement Equip 8 6 2 
4800=< siccd < 4900 Communication 0 0 0 
7400=< siccd < 7380 Computer 2 1 1 
8700=< siccd < 8800 Engineer and Consulting 2 1 1 
3300=< siccd < 3400 Primary 6 3 3 
4900=< siccd < 5000 Electric Utilities 2 1 1 
1000=< siccd < 1300  1400=< siccd < 2000 Mining and Construction 3 2 1 
1300=< siccd < 1400  2900=< siccd < 3000 Extraction 9 8 1 
2000=< siccd < 2111 Food 5 5 0 
2200=< siccd < 2780 Textiles and Printing 7 6 1 
4000=< siccd < 4800 Transportation and Air 3 3 0 
5000=< siccd < 6000 Retail 12 11 1 
7000=< siccd < 7370, 7380=< siccd < 8700,  
8800=< siccd < 9000 
Service 6 4 2 
Others  14 8 6 
Total   100a 64 36a 
 
a There is missing information for one firm. 
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Table 3 Results for Testing Hypotheses H1a and H1b.   
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
VAR Na Mean STD Median Q1 Q3 
CASHCOM 877 1191.96 1126.66 915.693 562.50 1433.68 
RET 877 0.0469 0.5203 0.0875 -0.1726 0.3261 
NI 877 128.7483 870.9939 28.9150 8.0376 79.4934 
NGNI 877 -23.0253 154.4448 0 0 0 
INDC 877 5.5170 48.7814 0 0 0 
DEDC 877 -5.5009 48.5056 0 0 0 
PODC 877 0.1391 0.34626 0 0 0 
NEDC 877 0.1414 0.34862 0 0 0 
CAP 877 0.2107 0.1965 0.1743 0.0400 0.3153 
NNI 877 0.1608 0.3675 0 0 0 
ROA 877 0.0475 0.0968 0.0537 0.0189 0.0876 
GR_RD 877 0.1187 0.8840 0 0 0.0528 
OCFAT 877 0.0939 0.0839 0.0920 0.0509 0.1350 
CHCPC 877 0.5391 0.2869 0.5121 0.3083 0.7643 
BONPC 877 0.1902 0.1647 0.1668 0.0483 0.2899 
MKPC 877 0.3991 0.2923 0.4038 0.1461 0.6384 
 
Panel B: Results for H1a and H1b 
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No change in CEO (CEO-tenure>4) No Change in CEO (CEO-tenure>5)   
 EST P value
b  EST P value  EST P value  EST P value  
NNI -41.9110 <.0001 -42.3682 <.0001 -42.6922 
 
<.0001 -42.8343 <.0001 
PODC   14.9333 0.02   17.6370 0.0034 
NEDC   -11.2046 0.1124  -11.5029 0.1046 
NI 0.0212 0.0003 0.0212 0.0003 0.0211 0.0003 0.0212 0.0003 
NGNI -0.0423 0.0066 -0.0428 0.0048 -0.0497 0.0002 -0.0468 0.0009 
INDC 0.5251 <.0001 0.3235 0.0208 0.1038 0.003 0.0745 0.0006 
IDCLT -0.4358 0.001 -0.2583 0.0615 0.0142 0.8348 -0.0116 0.8178 
DEDC 0.0014 0.9848 -0.0304 0.6908 -0.0021 0.9773 -0.0395 0.6041 
DDCLT 0.0491 0.5326 0.0621 0.4399 0.0611 0.4271 0.0815 0.2946 
RET 27.2306 <.0001 26.7534 <.0001 27.5804 <.0001 26.7433 <.0001 
CAP 71.1833 <.0001 72.5426 <.0001 71.9344 <.0001 72.7864 <.0001 
test         
021 =+ ββ  -0.0211 0.1589 -0.0216 0.138 -0.0286 0.0256 -0.0256 0.056 
043 =+ ββ  0.0893 <.0001 0.0651 <.0001 0.1180 <.0429 0.0629 0.1725 
065 =+ ββ  0.0505 0.0343 0.0316 0.2665 0.0589 0.0037 0.0420 0.0594 
Fixed effect yes  yes  yes  yes  
OBS   871   871  871  871  
Adj R-Sq 30.47%  30.47%  29.63%  30.47%    
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Table 3 continued 
No change in CEO (CEO-tenure>6) 
 EST P value  EST P value  
NNI -43.9947 
 
<.0001 -43.7554 <.0001 
PODC   16.3148 0.0057 
NEDC   -11.5171 0.1055 
NI 0.0211 0.0003 0.0212 0.0003 
NFNI -0.0505 0.0002 -0.0476 0.0007 
INDC 0.0960 0.0001 0.0654 0.0002 
IDCLT 0.4209 0.0582 0.2873 0.1418 
DEDC -0.0042 0.9546 -0.0416 0.5833 
DDCLT 0.0633 0.4015 0.0853 0.2672 
RET 27.1781 <.0001 26.5416 <.0001 
CAP 71.1871 <.0001 72.4515 <.0001 
test     
021 =+ ββ  -0.0294 0.0207 -0.0264 0.0462 
043 =+ ββ  0.5169 0.0191 0.3527 0.0695 
065 =+ ββ  0.0591 0.0028 0.0437 0.0372 
Fixed effect yes  yes  
OBS   871   871  
Adj R-Sq 29.83%  30.46%  
 
CCOM  Logarithm of cash compensation adjusted for inflation. 
NNI  A dummy variable set to one if earnings are negative and is zero otherwise 
PODC  A dummy variable set to one if discontinued operations are positive and is zero otherwise 
NEDC  A dummy variable set to one if discontinued operations are negative and is zero otherwise 
NI  Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, adjusted for inflation. 
NGNI  The product of NI and a dummy variable set to one if earnings before extraordinary items 
adjusted for inflations is negative, zero otherwise. 
INDC  Income-increasing discontinued operations adjusted for inflation. The product of 
discontinued operations adjusted for inflation and PODC. 
DEDC  Income-decreasing discontinued operations adjusted for inflation. The product of 
discontinued operations adjusted for inflation and NEDC. 
IDCLT  The product of INDC and a dummy variable set to one when CEO serve for more than 4,5 or 
6 years, and is zero otherwise.  
DDCLT  The product of DEDC and a dummy variable set to one when CEO serve for more than 4,5 
or 6years, and is zero otherwise. 
RET  Annual average security returns 
CAP  The ratio of long-term debt to total capital 
CASHCOM  CEO cash compensation sum of CEO salary and bonus before adjusted for inflations. 
ROA  Ratio of earnings before extraordinary items to the beginning period of assets. 
GR_RD  Annual growth in R&D expenditures. 
OCFAT  Ratio of operating cash flow to the beginning period of assets. 
CHCPC  The ratio of CEO cash compensation (salary plus bonus) to total CEO compensation.  
BONPC  The ratio of CEO bonus to total CEO compensation. 
MKPC  The ratio of CEO market-based compensation to total CEO compensation. 
a  This sample has further restriction that firms must have at least four years observations and 
no change in CEOs during this period. 
b  Heteroscedasticity adjusted P-value. 
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Table 4 Results for the hypotheses H2 and H3 (The Full Sample)  
ititTitTitiTit RDGRCGDPPMDCNMDCNGENPERM _54,...3,...210 αααααα +++++=  
ititititit LGPERMASTUNASTGRSALEGR εαααα +++++ −19876 __  
DEPVAL IBS (1) GMS (2) OCFS (3) 
 
Est SE P-val Est SE P-val Est SE P-val 
Intercept 0.8799 0.1330 <.0001 0.6752 0.1273 <.0001 1.0920 0.1164 <.0001 
NGEN -2.8460 0.1273 <.0001 -0.9639 0.1149 <.0001 -1.1741 0.1077 <.0001 
NMDC -0.7856 0.3811 0.0394 -0.6063 0.3495 0.0829 -0.5292 0.3231 0.1016 
PMDC -0.3509 0.1385 0.0113 -0.2829 0.1274 0.0264 0.2357 0.1178 0.0455 
CGDP -2.6455 0.9937 0.0078 1.7210 0.9109 0.059 1.3432 0.8442 0.1117 
GR_RD -0.3211 0.0860 0.0002 0.0129 0.0788 0.8695 0.0384 0.0729 0.5982 
GR_SALE 0.4917 0.2427 0.0428 2.6450 0.2235 <.0001 0.3568 0.2062 0.0837 
GR_AST -0.4893 0.1926 0.0111 -0.5522 0.1768 0.0018 0.0280 0.1635 0.8642 
ASTUN 0.1889 0.0953 0.0477 0.2250 0.0901 0.0126 0.3207 0.0818 <.0001 
LGPERM 0.3820 0.0185 <.0001 0.9408 0.0066 <.0001 0.5159 0.0166 <.0001 
AdjustedR2 34.33%   89.48%   35.40%   
OBS 2,898   2,898   2,896   
          6-year average 
        NMDC38 0.0947 0.2333 0.6848 -0.1434 0.2503 0.5667 0.1053 0.2008 0.6003
PMDC38 0.1436 0.1213 0.2366 -0.0298 0.1300 0.8188 0.1436 0.1046 0.1702 
 
         
NMDC49 0.2041 0.2966 0.4914 -0.1263 0.3131 0.6867 0.1594 0.2510 0.5255 
PMDC49 0.1811 0.1105 0.1013 0.0588 0.1164 0.6133 0.1716 0.0938 0.0674 
 
         
NMDC50 -0.1890 0.2538 0.4565 -0.1542 0.2646 0.5602 -0.0739 0.2106 0.7256 
PMDC50 0.1922 0.1982 0.3324 0.3188 0.2070 0.1236 0.2377 0.1649 0.1497 
 
         
NMDC61 -1.2237 0.5061 <.0157 0.0502 0.5286 0.9244 -0.6388 0.4189 0.1274 
PMDC61 0.2560 0.2009 <.2016 0.3500 0.2101 0.0958 0.2129 0.1664 0.2009 
 
         
NMDC72 -1.6092 0.3309 <.0001 -0.6470 0.3453 0.0611 -1.0492 0.2748 0.0001 
PMDC72 0.2092 0.2012 0.2985 0.3154 0.2124 0.1376 0.1389 0.1687 0.4105 
 
         
NMDC83 -1.1388 0.3425 0.0009 -0.7048 0.3147 0.0252 -1.3063 0.2917 <.0001 
PMDC83 -1.5748 0.2573 <.0001 -0.7734 0.2385 0.0012 0.2578 0.2189 0.2390 
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Table 4 continued 
 
NMDC The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1993-2003) is negative, otherwise zero. 
PMDC The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1993-2003) is positive, otherwise zero. 
NMDC38 The average discontinued operations between 1993- 1998. 
NMDC49 The average discontinued operations between 1994- 1999. 
NMDC50 The average discontinued operations between 1995- 2000. 
NMDC61 The average discontinued operations between 1996- 2001. 
NMDC72 The average discontinued operations between 1997- 2002. 
NMDC83 The average discontinued operations between 1998- 2003. 
PMDC38 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1993-1998) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC49 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1994-1999) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC50 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1995-2000) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC61 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1996-2001) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC72 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1997-2002) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC83 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1998-2003) is positive, otherwise zero. 
IBS Earnings before extraordinary items divided by outstanding share  
OCFS Operating cash flow divided by outstanding share  
GMS Gross margin (sales- COGS) divided by outstanding share  
NGEN A dummy variable set to one if earnings before extraordinary item are negative in the 
period between 2004 and 2008, otherwise is set to zero.  
CGDP The change in real GDP per capital from yeart-1 to yeart. 
GR_RD Annual growth in R&D expenditures. 
GR_SALE Annual growth in sales. 
GR_AST Annual growth in assets. 
ASTUN Asset turnover. 
LGPERM One year lags of the performance measure.  
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Table 5 Result for hypothesis H2 and H3 (The Restricted Sample) 
ititTitTitiTit RDGRCGDPPMDCMDCNGENPERM _54,...3,...210 αααααα +++++=  
ititititit LGPERMASTUNASTGRSALEGR εαααα +++++ −19876 __  
DEPVAL IBS (1) GMS (2) OCFS (3) 
 
Est SE P-val Est SE P-val Est SE P-val 
Intercept 0.8751 0.2731 0.0014 1.3470 0.2591 <.0001 1.3420 0.2226 <.0001 
NGEN -3.1866 0.2747 <.0001 -1.3188 0.2394 <.0001 -1.3312 0.2151 <.0001 
MDC -0.6647 0.4882 0.1737 -0.4055 0.4302 0.3461 -0.3447 0.3800 0.3646 
PMDC 0.2724 0.5299 0.6073 0.1057 0.4677 0.8213 0.5463 0.4133 0.1866 
CGDP -4.0953 2.0726 0.0484 3.1895 1.8330 0.0822 1.3609 1.6272 0.4032 
GR_RD -0.7667 0.2809 0.0064 0.0747 0.2470 0.7624 0.3667 0.2182 0.0931 
GR_SALE 1.0770 0.6311 0.0882 3.7662 0.5586 <.0001 -0.0795 0.4931 0.872 
GR_AST 1.0961 0.4564 0.0165 -0.8624 0.4028 0.0325 0.3415 0.3560 0.3376 
ASTUN 0.1011 0.1855 0.586 0.1257 0.1660 0.4489 0.2955 0.1463 0.0436 
LGPERM 0.4672 0.0288 <.0001 0.9006 0.0119 <.0001 0.4888 0.0288 <.0001 
AdjustedR2 38.55%   86.96%   32.96%   
OBS 987   987   985   
6-year average         
MDC38 0.1351 0.2153 0.5306 -0.0632 0.2675 0.8133 0.1837 0.2441 0.4518 
PMDC38 -0.0719 0.2466 0.7707 -0.0085 0.3067 0.9778 -0.0421 0.2800 0.8805 
MDC49 0.2382 0.2966 0.4016 -0.0631 0.3421 0.8536 0.2522 0.3106 0.4171 
PMDC49 -0.1459 0.1105 0.6358 0.0871 0.3714 0.8147 -0.0854 0.3372 0.8000 
MDC50 -0.0494 0.2560 0.8470 -0.0995 0.2994 0.7396 0.0002 0.2674 0.9993 
PMDC50 0.0470 0.3422 0.8908 0.3480 0.4008 0.3855 0.1619 0.3579 0.6511 
MDC61 -0.9746 0.5183 0.0604 0.1256 0.6070 0.8361 -0.5340 0.5420 0.3248 
PMDC61 1.0671 0.5820 0.0671 0.1699 0.6816 0.8032 0.6754 0.6090 0.2677 
MDC72 -1.6086 0.3465 <.0001 -0.5728 0.4038 0.1564 -1.1181 0.3587 0.0019 
PMDC72 1.7116 0.4255 <.0001 0.8366 0.4984 0.0936 1.2047 0.4428 0.0066 
MDC83 -0.8447 0.4436 0.0572 -0.6244 0.3924 0.1119 -1.2788 0.3470 0.0002 
PMDC83 -0.8107 0.5783 0.1613 -0.1672 0.5229 0.7492 1.4585 0.4564 0.0014 
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Table 5  continued 
MDC The average discontinued operations between 1993 and 2003. 
PMDC The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1993-2003) is positive, otherwise zero. 
MDC38 The average discontinued operations between 1993- 1998. 
MDC49 The average discontinued operations between 1994- 1999. 
MDC50 The average discontinued operations between 1995- 2000. 
MDC61 The average discontinued operations between 1996- 2001. 
MDC72 The average discontinued operations between 1997- 2002. 
MDC83 The average discontinued operations between 1998- 2003. 
PMDC38 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1993-1998) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC49 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1994-1999) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC50 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1995-2000) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC61 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1996-2001) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC72 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1997-2002) is positive, otherwise zero. 
PMDC83 The cross product between MDC and a dummy variable set to one when the average 
discontinued operations (1998-2003) is positive, otherwise zero. 
NGEN A dummy variable set to one if earnings before extraordinary item are negative in the period 
between 2004 and 2008, otherwise is set to zero.  
IBS Earnings before extraordinary items divided by outstanding share  
OCFS Operating cash flow  divided by outstanding share  
GMS Gross margin (sales- COGS) divided by outstanding share  
CGDP The change in real GDP per capital from yeart-1 to yeart. 
GR_RD Annual growth in R&D expenditures. 
GR_AST Annual growth in assets. 
GR_SALE Annual growth in sales. 
ASTUN Asset turnover. 
LGPERM One year lags of the performance measure. 
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 Table 6 Sensitivity Analysis Using A Long-tenured CEO Sample  
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Panel A: Descriptive Statistics  
 N Mean  STD Median   Q1 Q3 CASHCOM 371 1514.4 1492.96 1090 705.041 1836.91 
NNI 371 0.1617 0.3687 0 0 0 
NI 371 228.0475 1293.44 37.8710 9.0926 109.9032 
NGNI 371 -23.5232 96.4791 0 0 0 
INDC 371 9.2484 73.0665 0 0 0 
DEDC 371 -4.7082 51.1921 0 0 0 
RET 371 0.0368 0.5479 0.0843 -0.2006 0.3103 
CAP 371 0.2385 0.2188 0.1896 0.0515 0.3735 
 
Panel B: Test for Hypothesis H1 a and b Using A Long-tenured CEO Sample 
No change in CEO (CEO-tenure>4) 
 EST P value
a  EST P value  
NNI   -62.4493 <.0001 
NI 0.0190 0.0002 0.0182 0.0001 
NGNI -0.0386 0.239 -0.1403 0.0035 
INDC 0.0521 0.0168 0.0546 0.0318 
DEDC 0.0863 0.0017 0.0681 0.0318 
RET 22.6306 0.0045 20.0111 0.0091 
CAP 2.6280 0.9073 19.0425 0.3801 
021 =+ ββ  -0.0200 0.5456 
 
-0.1221 
 
0.0106 
 
Fixed effect yes  yes  
OBS   369   370  
Adj R-Sq 25.26%  28.75%  
 
CASHCOM  Cash compensation adjusted for inflation. 
CCOM  Logarithm of cash compensation adjusted for inflation. 
NNI  A dummy variable set to one if earnings are negative and is zero otherwise 
NI  Earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, adjusted for inflation. 
NGNI  The product of NI and a dummy variable set to one if earnings before extraordinary items 
adjusted for inflations are negative, zero otherwise. 
INDC  Income-increasing discontinued operations adjusted for inflation. The product of 
discontinued operations adjusted for inflation and PODC. 
DEDC  Income-decreasing discontinued operations adjusted for inflation. The product of 
discontinued operations adjusted for inflation and NEDC. 
RET  Annual average security returns 
CAP  The ratio of long-term debt to total capital 
a  Heteroscedasticity adjusted P-value. 
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Figure 1: The Expected Impact of Disposal Decisions on CEOs Cash Compensation.  
 
  DC EFFECT ON CASH COMPENSAION 
CURRENT CASH COMP  FUTURE CASH COMP 
 
DC 
Income-increasing DCs Increase Decrease 
Income-decreasing DCs Decrease Increase 
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Figure 2 Six-Year Rolling Average Evaluation  
 
The effect of six-year rolling averages on ex post performance measures is evaluated as shown above. The 
first line indicates the time line, 1993 to 2008. In the second line the six-year rolling average of DCs is 
calculated between 1993 and 1998 (MDC38) . It indicates that the effect of this six-year rolling average 
(MDC38) on firm performance between 2004 and 2008. The third line shows the effect of the six-year 
average between 1994 and 1999 (MDC49) on firm performance between 2004 and 2008 and then so on. 
The duration of the effect of DCs on firm performance is assessed in the following way. When MDC38 is 
significantly associated with ex post performance measure IBS, it indicates that DCs occurred between 
1993 and 1998 have an impact on IBS during 2004-2008. In my analysis, this is the longest impact of 
DCs on future firm performance about 10 years.    
 
